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Introduction 
 
Two years have now elapsed since the tech-stock share bubble burst – most notably 
on the NASDAQ in New York, but engulfing other high-tech markets as well.  In 
Britain, as in other countries, the overall stock market environment has been relatively 
bearish in the intervening period.  The two events are not causally linked, in that the 
subsequent decline in established and blue-chip markets is not directly attributable to 
contagion spreading from the high-tech sector.  Yet, taken together, these events have 
served to divert the attention of both the academic and the policy communities from 
the wider implications of the ‘new economy’.  The ‘new economy’ became so 
associated with the image of an ever more bullish stock market that the mere presence 
of falling share prices has stalled the debate about what the ‘new economy’ is, what 
benefits it could bring, and how it could be integrated into existing economic 
structures.  I suggest that the time is now right to revisit that debate and, in so doing, 
to reclaim the discussion of the ‘new economy’ from the share price bubble with 
which it has been popularly linked. 
 
This article draws on the comparative political economy of financial systems.  It is 
usual within that literature to focus on the distinction between, on the one hand, the 
capital market based financial systems of the US and the UK and, on the other, the 
bank based financial systems of Western Europe and South-East Asia.  Each system is 
built upon a specific set of institutional conditions which, in turn, provide specific 
forms of comparative advantage for the national economy in which such conditions 
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are embedded.  Of particular concern for this study is the suggestion that bank based 
financial systems are more effective in facilitating the integration of fully developed 
production technologies into existing economic structures, whilst capital market based 
financial systems provide significant first-mover advantage in facilitating the initial 
development of those new technologies. 
 
The conclusion one might draw from this is that Britain’s capital market based 
financial system will ease the introduction of ‘new economy’ operating procedures 
into the British economy.  However, I argue that such a conclusion misunderstands 
the nature of capital flows into the British stock market.  The vast majority of such 
flows circulate only to increase the nominal value of the original capital asset.  They 
are used to purchase shares of established companies who have only limited recourse 
to the stock market to provide new working capital for themselves.  Indeed, the new 
investments of these established companies are almost entirely self-financed through 
retained trading profits.  As such, Britain’s capital market based financial system 
provides few sources of finance for new productive investments, be that in the ‘new 
economy’ or elsewhere.  I conclude with a number of observations on the policy 
implications of this finding, focusing in particular on the possibility of creating 
market incentives to increase the flow of funds through the stock market into new 
productive investments. 
 
 
 
Comparing Financial Systems: the Received Wisdom 
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It is generally accepted that the US ‘new economy’ – the undoubted star performer in 
this area – has benefited significantly from the dynamism of its capital market based 
financial system.  Nonetheless, the impact of the capital market on the US ‘new 
economy’ has been something of a double-edged sword.  In a whole range of cases, 
the highly liquid nature of the American venture capital market in the late 1990s led 
to the capitalisation of ‘new economy’ companies that were unable to recover their 
costs through profits generated from the product market.  Instead, their cost recovery 
strategies required that they raise further funds through the stock market, thus 
reinforcing the existing share price bubble on NASDAQ.  Prior to the tech-stock 
crash, the US stock market appeared to be operating to two distinct logics.  For 
established firms without digital prospects, price/earnings ratios were forced down as 
investors demanded good news on profits as a sign that operating costs could be more 
than adequately recovered through the product market.  By contrast, for ‘new 
economy’ firms with digital prospects, price/earnings ratios were allowed to inflate to 
historic highs as investors overlooked adverse profits warnings and accepted that 
costs could be recovered through the capital market.  Whilst the US capital market 
clearly helped to feed the dynamism of the country’s ‘new economy’ in the late 
1990s, it is also clear that it was responsible for creating the financial house of cards 
that collapsed so spectacularly amidst the subsequent tech-stock crash. 
 
Despite this cautionary tale of capital market excess, UK policy-makers have tended 
only to emphasise the positive nature of the relationship between the capital market 
and the ‘new economy’.  They have pointed to the fact that the US and the UK have 
similar capital market based financial systems to suggest that Britain is singularly well 
placed to emulate America’s ‘new economy’ successes.  Moreover, such a suggestion 
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extends beyond the policy-making to the academic community.  It is certainly the 
conclusion that one might read into the comparative political economy literature on 
financial systems. 
 
Two distinctive trajectories of economic development are invoked within that 
literature, corresponding to an ideal-typical dualism around which the financial 
systems of the advanced capitalist economies can be distributed analytically.  On one 
side of this dualism we find bank based financial systems, on the other capital market 
based financial systems.  The former typically exhibit smooth development 
trajectories, which reflect institutional conditions that reward investments oriented 
towards long-term/low-risk gains.  The latter typically exhibit more punctuated 
development trajectories, in which the short-term/high-risk orientation of the system 
is most effective in those moments of creative destruction where new technologies 
overhaul the modus operandi of the existing productive regime.  I now take each 
system in turn, as they have different implications for the way in which the ‘new 
economy’ is likely to develop. 
 
Firstly, bank based systems are assumed to provide institutional conditions suited to 
assimilating innovations within existing firm structures, rather than to promoting 
innovation per se.  Close inter-personal relations are encouraged between bank 
personnel and the managers of firms.  Through such relations, firms find that they are 
under relatively little pressure to recover costs immediately, and so can develop 
business plans oriented specifically to the long-term.  With banks ensuring favourable 
terms for the allocation of investment capital beyond the short-term, firms have the 
opportunity to engage in the internal restructuring required for the development of 
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new production regimes based on new technologies.  However, whilst firms operating 
in bank based financial systems may experience institutional conditions favourable to 
becoming efficient users of new technologies, the same conditions are usually argued 
to restrict their capacity to develop new technologies in the first place.  The quid pro 
quo of banks’ willingness to make investment capital available on a long-term basis is 
their unwillingness to fund potentially high-risk projects.  The development of ‘new 
economy’ innovations around digital technologies clearly constitutes one such project. 
 
The comparative political economy literature on financial systems suggests that 
capital market based systems are more suited to capitalising technological 
innovations.  Within such systems, investment capital is made available to firms on a 
purely competitive basis.  Unlike in bank based systems, established firms are not 
privileged (vis-à-vis new start-ups) in the allocation of credit.  For, the close inter-
personal relations that shape the allocation of credit in bank based systems, and which 
can only develop over time as a firm becomes established in its product market, are 
simply not a feature of the arms-length relationship between finance and industry in 
capital market based systems.  It is assumed to matter less in capital market based 
systems who is proposing the business plan than it does what the business plan is. 
 
Capital markets are assumed to act as a means of matching the risk-return preferences 
of lenders to the proposed business plans of borrowers.  A bank that increases its 
exposure to liabilities by making credit available to firms on a long-term basis is 
likely to be relatively risk-averse in its pattern of lending.  Moreover, because 
individual bank managers have few incentives, if any, to depart significantly from the 
asset/liability ratio of the sector as a whole, all banks are likely to be relatively risk-
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averse.  The same is not assumed to be the case within capital market based systems.  
Capital markets are argued to provide the ideal institutional conditions for facilitating 
innovation, as they bring together large numbers of anonymous lenders with, 
potentially, equally large differences in risk-aversion.  Some of these lenders will not 
believe that the return to innovation will be sufficiently large (be that ‘new economy’ 
innovation or otherwise) to make their savings available to firms operating at the 
frontier of technological development.  Yet, some may well do so.  Lenders within 
capital market based financial systems may therefore have less of a generic tendency 
towards risk-aversion than lenders in bank based systems. 
 
It is certainly argued in much of the literature on the ‘new economy’ that the absence 
of such a tendency within the American financial system was highly conducive to the 
development of the US ‘new economy’.  Moreover, given the institutional similarities 
between the financial systems of the US and the UK, many have pointed to the 
possibility that Britain can simply import America’s ‘new economy’ successes.  I turn 
now to challenge that supposition. 
 
 
 
Financial Systems in Theory and Practice 
 
Whilst the above account of the ‘comparative institutional advantage’ of bank based 
and capital market based financial systems dominates the academic literature in this 
area, it is nonetheless a caricature of actually existing financial systems – and a fairly 
crude one at that.  It is premised upon an ideal-typical dualism, in which every 
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country exhibits either one set of institutional conditions (and, therefore, one form of 
comparative institutional advantage) or another.  Moreover, each set of institutional 
conditions is assumed to be experienced in full.  Thinking in such terms may be 
acceptable as an academic thought experiment, but it is unlikely to provide a reliable 
guide for policy.  Three points might usefully be made in this respect. 
 
Firstly, it is clear that the distinctions between bank based and capital market based 
financial systems have never been as sharp in practice as they are in theory.  The 
comparative political economy literature focuses almost exclusively on the structure 
of financial institutions rather than on the financial instruments they issue.  The latter 
comparison is likely to downplay the significance of differences between financial 
systems, whilst the former is likely to highlight them.  And even here it is important 
not to over-emphasise the differences between national financial systems.  Banks are 
key actors in those national economies typically characterised as exhibiting capital 
market based systems, and capital markets are key actors in those national economies 
typically characterised as exhibiting bank based systems.  For instance, before their 
divergent trajectories in the 1990s, the Japanese stock market had overtaken the 
American as the most highly capitalised in the world.  Yet, Japan is assumed within 
the comparative political economy literature to be one of the two prime exemplars of 
a bank based financial system.  More recently, in 2000, when the respective boards of 
directors of the London Stock Exchange and the Frankfurt Deutsche Börse agreed to 
merge their exchanges, this was presented as a merger of equals.  Yet, Germany is 
assumed within the comparative political economy literature to be the other prime 
exemplar of a bank based financial system. 
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Secondly, even if the distinction between bank based and capital market based 
financial systems was as robust in practice as in theory, there may still be reason to 
question the further supposition that capital markets will necessarily be better for 
encouraging technological innovation.  This conclusion, although received wisdom in 
the academic literature, is read off from a remarkably small number of isolated 
historical cases.  In particular, it is based on the capitalisation of the railways in mid-
nineteenth century Britain and the capitalisation of the electronics and computer based 
industries in mid-twentieth century America.  In both instances, significant sources of 
investment capital were raised through share issues on the stock market.  Yet, there 
are many more instances in which the development of productivity enhancing 
technologies is completely unrelated to the strength and vitality of the domestic stock 
market.  Indeed, the two countries with the most deeply capitalised stock markets – 
the US and the UK – have the least impressive productivity indicators of all the 
OECD countries in the post-war era. 
 
Thirdly, and most importantly in policy terms, it is necessary to focus not only on the 
overall level of stock market activity, but also on the specific pattern of share trading 
that dominates the market environment.  Britain may well boast a highly liquid and a 
deeply capitalised stock market, but this is no guarantee that the flow of funds within 
that market will facilitate entrepreneurship, be that in the ‘new economy’ or 
elsewhere.  Indeed, there are many reasons to suggest that this is unlikely to be the 
case. 
 
For a start, trade in the shares of FTSE-100 firms dominates all other stock market 
activity, roughly by a factor of four.  Over three-quarters of all investments on the 
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London Stock Exchange (LSE) are concentrated in only one hundred firms.  This is 
trade in the established shares of established firms.  It is conducted to provide a stable 
asset base in the portfolios of the large institutional investors that are the major 
players on the LSE.  It does not in general provide new funds for productive 
investments.  The companies whose shares are traded most extensively in Britain are 
almost entirely self-sufficient in terms of funding new capital investment projects.  
Indeed, this is an accurate reflection of the corporate sector in Britain as a whole.  
Throughout the period 1980-2000, the UK corporate sector retained a significant 
residual in undistributed cash earnings of around £1 billion – a figure which is very 
close to that sector’s overall spending on productive investment.  Around nine-tenths 
of new productive investments within the British corporate sector have originated in 
ploughed-back profits over the last twenty years. 
 
The main role of the stock market within British society is to turn household savings 
into new wealth and future consumption possibilities, rather than new productive 
capabilities.  Thus, the stock market is no longer tied to the productive needs of the 
economy, so much as to the reproductive needs of the prevailing social structure.  
With the productive emphasis of the stock market being reconsidered in this way, 
there is no guarantee that Britain’s capital market based system is compatible with the 
financial needs of the ‘new economy’.  Indeed, it is possible to state the argument in 
stronger terms than this – the specificities of Britain’s capital market based system 
would appear to be wholly incompatible with the financial needs of the ‘new 
economy’. 
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We may also be led to this conclusion by recognising a number of important 
differences between the capital market structure of the US and the UK.  Perhaps most 
significantly, Britain lacks the degree of integration of America’s venture capital, 
primary and secondary stock markets.  Whilst the cautionary tale about over-
exuberant venture capital markets recounted earlier in this article remains a relevant 
warning about the limits and weaknesses of the venture capital cycle, Britain’s stock 
market structure provides few incentives for a buoyant venture capital industry to 
promote ‘new economy’ entrepreneurship.  By contrast, prior to the tech-stock crash, 
US venture capitalists found a vibrant secondary stock market in NASDAQ.  This 
made possible profitable ‘exit’ from investments in ‘new economy’ start-ups, in a way 
denied similar firms in Britain. 
 
 
 
Capitalising a ‘New Economy’ in Britain 
 
Our understanding of the ‘new economy’ in Britain is therefore conditioned by 
whether we focus on the actual structure of the UK’s capital markets, or the 
theoretical advantages provided by an ideal-typical capital market structure.  The 
policy debate in Britain may thus far have been oriented around the latter, certainly in 
the extent to which its capital market structure has yet to appear in that debate as a 
potential impediment to future ‘new economy’ successes.  However, as soon as we 
focus on the actual structure of the UK’s capital markets, it is clear that policy-makers 
must do more than constantly reiterate their faith in British entrepreneurship for the 
UK to develop a significant ‘new economy’ sector.  Equally, changing educational 
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norms to emphasise vocational learning in the areas of computing and information 
technology is insufficient on its own to initiate a knowledge-based economy.  Two 
other changes are also required. 
 
Firstly, it is necessary to change the structures of Britain’s financial system, in order 
to foster deeper integration between the venture capital, primary and secondary stock 
markets.  British venture capital firms have directed significantly more of their 
investments into existing companies than their American counterparts.  They have 
concentrated most of their operations in financing merger and acquisitions activity, 
rather than new start-ups.  In large part, this is due to the very different degrees of 
capitalisation of Britain’s primary and secondary stock markets.  The absence of a 
deeply capitalised secondary market affords relatively few opportunities for 
successfully ‘exiting’ investments in newly established firms (whether they are 
located in the ‘new’ or the ‘old’ economy).  Instead, British venture capitalists tend to 
be attracted to control contests for established firms within the primary market. 
 
Secondly, and more importantly, it is necessary to change the dominant investment 
culture in Britain, in an attempt to reconnect trading patterns on the stock market with 
the productive needs of the economy.  At present, the vast majority of that trade is 
directed at reinforcing existing wealth differentials within society rather than into new 
capital formation.  To what extent may it be possible to use a system of market 
incentives in order to redress this current imbalance? 
 
At heart, the issue may be how to change the perceptual environment in which fund 
managers and other institutional investors operate, to make it feel just as normal for 
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them to direct the savings they command into fledgling companies seeking to expand 
production as into established companies seeking merely to protect their share price.  
Of course, such perceptual shifts first require changes to the institutional and the legal 
environments in which investors operate. 
 
It would make sense to target such reforms at institutional investors in particular, such 
is the control that they are able to exert over the market as a whole.  The power of the 
funds is generated through the way in which the personal savings of thousands of 
small investors are aggregated into a single portfolio, and it is demonstrated by the 
fact that around fifty top fund managers in effect ‘own’ a majority stake in UK 
industry. 
 
Most funds, especially those that provide for personal pensions cover, would seem to 
be perfectly able to diversify their investments to generate new flows of capital into 
firms seeking to expand existing productive capacities.  For, their liabilities are stable, 
predictable and, in most instances, extend far into the future.  Any short-term 
liabilities they may have can easily be covered by maintaining part of their portfolios 
within the area of the market dominated by trade in the share of FTSE-100 firms. 
 
However, whilst there may be no reason why pension fund managers are unable to 
diversify their investments in the interests of capitalising new firms, they have thus far 
shown little willingness to do so.  I suggest reform of the settlements system through 
which shares are traded in order to encourage investors to act in this way.  Settlements 
systems throughout the European Union are currently being overhauled as national 
exchanges respond to single capital market legislation by aligning themselves 
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competitively one against another, so now might be the ideal time to contemplate such 
proposals. 
 
I propose changes to the settlements system to allow settlement costs to be written off 
against withholding and/or capital gains tax.  However, such reforms should not apply 
across the board, but should be targeted at shareholdings in companies listed on 
secondary stock markets.  In order to tailor this proposal specifically to the interests of 
the ‘new economy’, a sliding scale of exemptions could be introduced, structured in 
favour of high-tech markets in particular.  Working to the same principle, FTSE-100 
firms should not be included in the exemptions scheme. 
 
Such proposals would lower the costs of trading in shares listed on ‘exempt’ markets 
relative to those in FTSE-100 firms.  As a consequence, this would increase their 
effective price above the value of their market price, offering market incentives for 
funds to diversify their portfolios.  Funds are renowned for trading on very small 
margins, so the level of the exemption would not have to be large for us to expect a 
reform of this nature to elicit a significant change in the pattern of investor behaviour.  
The cost to the exchequer of such a scheme would be small, and could in any case be 
recouped by the subsequent increase in corporation tax receipts resulting from a boost 
to productive capacity. 
 
It may be possible to reinforce these behavioural shifts by introducing additional 
changes to capital gains law.  Portfolio investors who have gross fund status enjoy 
both capital gains and income tax exemptions.  It would be relatively straightforward 
to make these tax breaks conditional upon funds diversifying their portfolios by 
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increasing their exposure to secondary markets.  In order to remain eligible for 
continuing tax relief, funds would have to demonstrate a balanced investment 
schedule which was not unduly weighted towards the shares of FTSE-100 firms.  To 
target such a scheme specifically at the ‘new economy’, once again special 
dispensations could be offered to funds that invested in high-tech stock above a 
certain threshold. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
If the usual distinction found in the academic literature between the comparative 
advantage of different financial systems holds true, Britain would appear to be doubly 
damned in relation to the ‘new economy’.  On the one hand, it lacks a bank based 
financial system and, as such, is typically argued to lack the institutional conditions 
for assimilating developed digital technologies into existing economic structures.  On 
the other hand, actual flows of funds around its capital market are likely to impede the 
development of new digital technologies in Britain, even though it is capital market 
based financial systems that in general are argued to perform such tasks.  On the 
whole, stock market investments in Britain are not directed into the capitalisation of 
new productive capacity.  Consequently, the prospects do not seem to be good for 
Britain to be either a successful assimilator or a successful innovator in digital 
technologies.  Will the ‘new economy’ therefore bypass Britain altogether? 
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I have used this article to argue that this does not necessarily have to be the case.  
However, the investment culture currently embedded in Britain’s capital markets is 
likely to prove – and, indeed, has already proved – a significant constraint on a British 
‘new economy’.  I have suggested a number of policy reforms aimed at redressing the 
current imbalance between the amount of investment that British stock markets 
channel into FTSE-100 firms compared with the amount of investment that is 
channelled into new firms.  My proposals focus in particular on inducing new patterns 
of behaviour amongst institutional investors, by providing them with market 
incentives for investing in high-tech firms.  Whilst questions may legitimately be 
raised about the specific details of the proposals contained here, I suggest that the 
broader case for introducing policies of this nature is largely unanswerable. 
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